TELL THE TRUTH
Artículo
de Thomas
L. Friedman en "The New York
Times" del 19-2-03
El formateado es mío (L. B.-B.)
Con un muy breve comentario al final.
Luis Bouza-Brey
As I was listening to the French foreign minister make
his case at the U.N. for giving Saddam Hussein more time to comply, I was
struck by the number of people in the Security Council chamber who applauded. I
wish there were someone I could applaud for.
Sorry, I can't applaud the French foreign minister,
because I don't believe that France, which sold Saddam his first nuclear
reactor, the one Israel blew up, comes to this story with the lofty principles
it claims. The French foreign minister, after basking in the applause at the
U.N., might ask himself who was clapping for his speech back in Baghdad and who
was crying. Saddam was clapping, and all his political prisoners — i.e., most
Iraqis — were crying.
But I don't have much applause in me for China, Russia
— or the Bush team either. I feel lately as if there are no adults in this room
(except Tony Blair). No, this is not a plague-on-all-your-houses column. I side
with those who believe we need to confront Saddam — but we have to do it right,
with allies and staying power, and the Bush team has bungled that.
The Bush folks are big on attitude, weak on strategy
and terrible at diplomacy. I covered the first gulf war, in 1990-91. What I
remember most are the seven trips I took with Secretary of State James A. Baker
III around the world to watch him build — face-to-face — the coalition and
public support for that war, before a shot was fired. Going to someone else's
country is a sign you respect his opinion. This Bush team has done no such
hands-on spade work. Its members think diplomacy is a phone call.
They don't like to travel. Seeing senior Bush
officials abroad for any length of time has become like rare-bird sightings.
It's probably because they spend so much time infighting in Washington over
policy, they're each afraid that if they leave town their opponents will change
the locks on their office doors.
Also, you would think that if Iraq were the focus of
your whole foreign policy, maybe you would have handled North Korea with a
little less attitude, so as not to trigger two wars at once. Maybe you would
have come up with that alternative — which President Bush promised — to the
Kyoto treaty, a treaty he trashed to the great anger of Europe. You're not
going to get much support in Europe telling people, "You are either with
us or against us in a war on terrorism, but in the war you care about — for a
greener planet — America will do whatever it wants."
I am also very troubled by the way Bush officials have tried to justify this war on the
grounds that Saddam is allied with Osama bin Laden or will be soon. There
is simply no proof of that, and every time I hear them repeat it I think of the
Gulf of Tonkin resolution. You don't take the country to war on the wings of a
lie.
Tell people the truth. Saddam
does not threaten us today. He can be deterred. Taking him out is a war of
choice — but it's a legitimate choice. It's because he is undermining the U.N.,
it's because if left alone he will seek weapons that will threaten all his
neighbors, it's because you believe the people of Iraq deserve to be liberated
from his tyranny, and it's because you intend to help Iraqis create a
progressive state that could stimulate reform in the Arab/Muslim world, so that
this region won't keep churning out angry young people who are attracted to
radical Islam and are the real weapons of mass destruction.
That's the case for war — and it will
require years of occupying Iraq and a simultaneous effort to defuse the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict to create a regional context for success.
If done right, such a war could shrink Al Qaeda's influence — but Al Qaeda is a
separate enemy that will have to be fought separately, and will remain a threat
even if Saddam is ousted.
It is legitimate for Europeans to
oppose such a war, but not simply by sticking a thumb in our eye and their
heads in the sand. It's also legitimate for the Bush folks to focus the
world on Saddam, but two years of their gratuitous bullying has made many
people deaf to America's arguments. Too many people today no longer accept
America's strength as a good thing. That is a bad thing.
Some of this we can't control. But some we can, which
is why it's time for the Bush team to shape up — dial down the attitude, start
selling this war on the truth, give us a budget that prepares the nation for a
war abroad, not a party at home, and start doing everything possible to create
a global context where we can confront Saddam without the world applauding for
him.
Muy breve comentario final.
Luis Bouza-Brey
(19-2-03)
No está tan claro que Saddam no sea una
amenaza inmediata: ¿no lo es sobre Israel, directamente o por medio de los
grupos terroristas fundamentalistas? Pero es que, además, ¿qué es inmediato,
teniendo armas químicas y biológicas? Un maletín en manos de un loco o un
fanático puede ser una amenaza inmediata para miles de personas, y sólo será
detectable a posteriori. Pero también es inmediato el peligro de servir
de ejemplo de proliferación de armas de destrucción masiva para otros
países.
No obstante, sí que es cierto que
muchos no sienten ---equivocadamente--- estas amenazas como inmediatas. Pero lo
que sí que es absolutamente incoherente y torpe es centrar la solución al
problema en el desarme por medio de las inspecciones: sólo gracias a la
presencia militar norteamericana-británica se ha conseguido la vuelta de los
inspectores, pero no el desarme. Pero ni la presión militar ni las inspecciones
se pueden prolongar indefinidamente sin resultados. La amenaza tiene que ser
creíble y real, o las NNUU y EEUU harían el ridículo; y los resultados tienen
que ser inmediatos o sucedería lo mismo.
Pero hay algo más: si se consiguiera un
desarme parcial, porque Hussein revelara una parte de sus arsenales en algún
momento, ¿qué sucedería? ¿se habría acabado el
problema? ¿volverían los ejércitos que hoy circundan
Irak a sus bases? ¿si así fuera, cuánto duraría la labor
de las inspecciones: meses hasta que los echaran, o años sin conseguir
nada?¿volvería Hussein a rearmarse al cabo de unos meses? ¿o
estaríamos doce años más inspeccionando, embargando y sacrificando al pueblo iraquí?
Acaben de una vez con él y liberen Irak,
antes de que la situación de bloqueo e indecisión se pudra de tal manera que la
acción sea imposible. No hay otra salida. Lo que hay que conseguir es acertar
con los medios para hacer el menor daño posible: al pueblo iraquí, a las
instituciones mundiales, y al liderazgo norteamericano.